Abstract. Trapdoor Decisional Diffie-Hellman (TDDH) groups, introduced by Dent and Galbraith (ANTS 2006), are groups where the DDH problem is hard, unless one is in possession of a secret trapdoor which enables solving it efficiently. Despite their intuitively appealing properties, they have found up to now very few cryptographic applications. Moreover, among the two constructions of such groups proposed by Dent and Galbraith, only a single one based on hidden pairings remains unbroken. In this paper, we extend the set of trapdoor DDH groups by giving a construction based on composite residuosity. We also introduce a more restrictive variant of these groups that we name static trapdoor DDH groups, where the trapdoor only enables to solve the DDH problem with respect to a fixed pair (G, G x ) of group elements. We give two constructions for such groups whose security relies respectively on the RSA and the factoring assumptions. Then, we show that static trapdoor DDH groups yield elementary constructions of convertible undeniable signature schemes allowing delegatable verification. Using our constructions of static trapdoor DDH groups from the RSA or the factoring assumption, we obtain slightly simpler variants of the undeniable signature schemes of respectively Gennaro, Rabin, and Krawczyk (J. Cryptology, 2000) and Galbraith and Mao (CT-RSA 2003). These new schemes are conceptually more satisfying since they can strictly be viewed as instantiations, in an adequate group, of the original undeniable signature scheme of Chaum and van Antwerpen (CRYPTO '89).
Introduction

The CDH and DDH Problems
Given a group G and an element G ∈ G of large order, the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is to compute G xy , given G x and G y for random integers x, y. The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is to distinguish the two distributions (G x , G y , G xy ) and (G x , G y , G z ) for random and independent integers x, y, z. Usually, when considering the status of various groups with respect to the CDH and DDH problems, one of the following two cases arises: either the CDH and DDH problems are both presumably hard (this is the case for example for subgroups of large prime order of Z * p , p prime), or the group is a so-called gap group: the CDH problem is (presumably) hard while the DDH problem is universally easy (i.e. easy given only the description of the group law, which seems to be the minimal publicly available information to obtain useful applications). The latter case typically arises in certain elliptic curve groups equipped with bilinear pairings [MOV93, FMR99] , and has given rise to many important applications in cryptography [Jou00, BF01, BLS04].
Trapdoor DDH Groups
Trapdoor DDH groups (TDDH groups for short), introduced by Dent and Galbraith [DG06] , lie somewhere between the above two cases. These are groups where the DDH problem is hard, except if one possesses a trapdoor for solving it efficiently. Dent and Galbraith gave two candidates for such groups based on the concept of hidden pairings, one in elliptic curves over the ring Z N , where N is hard to factor, and the other one based on Frey's idea of disguising an elliptic curve [Fre98] . Subsequently, the
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second proposal was broken by Morales [Mor08] . Since the DDH problem is the basis of so many cryptosystems [Bon98] , the concept of trapdoor DDH groups is very attractive. Indeed, it should enable to control more precisely who is able to solve the DDH problem in a system. This may help in situations where there is a conflict between security, which requires a group where the DDH problem is hard, and some interesting additional functionalities that could be achieved thanks to an algorithm for solving the DDH problem. One example that comes to mind is threshold ElGamal encryption. In threshold ElGamal encryption [DF89] , given a secret/public key pair (x, X = G x ), each decryption server is given a share x i of the secret key, to which is associated a "partial" public key G x i . In order to decrypt a ciphertext (R, Y ) = (G r , M X r ), each server participating to decryption must compute a decryption share S i = R x i . Hence, checking whether a decryption share from a server is correct or not amounts to deciding whether (X i , R, S i ) is a DDH tuple or not. Yet IND-CPA-security of ElGamal encryption is equivalent to the hardness of the DDH problem in the underlying group G [TY98] . Hence, there seems to be no other choice than using a group where the DDH problem is hard, thereby condemning other participants to be unable to distinguish correct decryption shares from incorrect ones. We do not claim that TDDH groups are the best way to solve this problem (this can be more easily achieved by having each server provide a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that his decryption share is correctly computed), and this example only serves to argue that sometimes, one may want that only some authorized party be able to solve the DDH problem. Despite these considerations, TDDH groups have found up to now very few cryptographic applications. In their original paper, Dent and Galbraith gave only one example, namely an identification scheme. To the best of our knowledge, the only previous paper proposing a non-trivial application of TDDH groups (namely the construction of statistically hiding sets, a variant of zero-knowledge sets) is due to Prabhakaran and Xue [PX09] .
Contributions of this Work
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, at a conceptual level, we refine the definition of TDDH groups of Dent and Galbraith by requiring that the CDH problem remain hard even given the trapdoor for solving the DDH problem. This was not made explicit in the formalization by Dent and Galbraith, yet we think that this is probably a key feature for many interesting applications, such as undeniable signatures for example. We also broaden the set of constructions of trapdoor DDH groups. We propose a new construction based on composite residuosity in Z * N 2 (similar considerations have been made by [BCP03] , albeit not in the formalism of TDDH groups), and identify under which hardness assumptions this group satisfies our definition. A drawback of this construction is that it lacks what we call perfect soundness, meaning that the algorithm solving the DDH problem with the trapdoor can sometimes err and declare valid a non-DH tuple.
Then, we introduce a variant of trapdoor DDH groups that we name static trapdoor DDH groups. Their definition is very similar to the one of trapdoor DDH groups, except that the trapdoor for solving the DDH problem is now dedicated to a specific pair of group elements (G, G x ), hence the name static. We then show that such groups can be easily constructed from the RSA and the factoring problems. This concept abstracts some of the ideas underlying the work of Hofheinz and Kiltz [HK09] , who showed that the Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) problem (i.e. solving the CDH problem given access to a static DDH oracle) is hard in the so-called group of signed quadratic residues under the factoring assumption.
Finally, we describe a very natural application of (static or not) TDDH groups to convertible undeniable signature schemes. Namely, the construction we propose is exactly the original undeniable signature scheme proposed by Chaum and van Antwerpen [CvA89] (for which deciding the validity of a signature is equivalent to solving the DDH problem), but in a TDDH group rather than simply a group where the DDH problem is hard. The trapdoor for solving the DDH problem can then be used to universally convert or delegate verification of signatures. Once instantiated with our proposals of static TDDH groups based on the RSA or the factoring problems, we obtain schemes similar to previous RSAbased undeniable signature schemes due to Gennaro, Rabin, and Krawczyk [GRK00] and Galbraith and Mao [GM03] . However, these new schemes are conceptually simpler and easier to analyze. Moreover, since they are strict instantiations of the Chaum and van Antwerpen scheme, their confirmation and disavowal protocols can use classical proofs of equality or inequality of discrete logarithms, which are simpler and more efficient than what was proposed previously for the schemes of [GRK00, GM03].
Open Problems
Two key features of TDDH groups are perfect soundness (the property that the algorithm for solving the DDH problem with the trapdoor perfectly distinguishes DH tuples from non-DH tuples), and the possibility to securely hash into the group (see discussion in Section 2.3). However, none of the two candidates for TDDH groups (the hidden pairing based proposal of [DG06] , and our proposal in Section 3.2) fulfills both requirements. We think that providing a plausible candidate possessing both properties is the key to enable powerful applications of TDDH groups. 1 A related open problem is whether there exists a (plausible construction of a) TDDH group with publicly known (ideally prime) order, since they are usually simpler to use in cryptography.
Organization
In Section 2 we give some basic definitions and introduce some of the tools we will need in the remainder of the paper. In Section 3, we define trapdoor DDH groups, and give a construction based on composite residuosity. In Section 4, we introduce static trapdoor DDH groups, and give two constructions based on respectively the RSA and the factoring assumptions. Finally, in Section 5, we show how to obtain convertible undeniable signature schemes from static TDDH groups, and discuss their instantiation with the constructions described previously.
Preliminaries
Notation and Definitions
The set of integers i such that a ≤ i ≤ b will be denoted [a; b]. The security parameter will be denoted k. A function f of the security parameter is said negligible if for any c > 0, f (k) ≤ 1/k c for sufficiently large k. When S is a non-empty finite set, we write s ← $ S to mean that a value is sampled uniformly at random from S and assigned to s.
we denote the operation of running the (possibly probabilistic) algorithm A on inputs x, y, . . . with access to oracles O 1 , O 2 , . . . (possibly none), and letting z be the output. PPT will stand for probabilistic polynomial-time. Given two Interactive Turing Machines P and V, we denote w ← P(x), V(y) (z) to mean that the output of the interaction of P with private input x and V with private input y on common input z is w.
Given an integer N , the multiplicative group of integers modulo N is denoted Z * N . This group has order φ(N ) where φ(·) is the Euler function and exponent λ(N ) where λ(·) is the Carmichael function. We denote J N the subgroup of Z * N of all elements x ∈ Z * N with Jacobi symbol x N = 1. This subgroup has index 2 and order φ(N )/2 in Z * N . Moreover it is efficiently recognizable even without the factorization of N since the Jacobi symbol is efficiently computable given only N . We also denote QR N the subgroup of quadratic residues of Z * N . This subgroup is widely believed not to be efficiently recognizable when N is composite and its factorization is unknown (this is the Quadratic Residuosity assumption). We call a prime number p such that (p − 1)/2 is prime a safe prime.
In all the following, given a group G, we use the notation [G] to denote a description of the group, i.e. an efficient algorithm for computing the group operation. This notation always implies that G is efficiently recognizable. We assume that it is always possible to derive from the description of the group a negligibly close upper bound on the order |G| of the group (in some cases the exact order may be efficiently computable), and we use the notation |G| + to denote this upper bound. 2 Given an element G ∈ G, we denote ord(G) its order, G the group generated by G, Dlog G (X) the discrete logarithm in base G of an element X ∈ G , and
. We also denote DH G ⊂ G 3 the set of Diffie-Hellman (DH) tuples with respect to G:
A group generator Gen is a PPT algorithm which on input a security parameter 1 k , outputs a tuple
is the description of a group G, G ∈ G is an element of order 2 Θ(k) , and γ is some arbitrary side information. We say that the CDH problem is hard for Gen if for any PPT adversary A, the following probability is negligible:
We say that the DDH problem is hard for Gen if for any PPT adversary A, the following advantage is negligible:
Proofs of Equality and Inequality of Discrete Logarithms
Protocols for proving, given (G, X, Y, Z) ∈ G, the equality of discrete logarithms (EDL) Dlog G (X) = Dlog Y (Z) or the inequality of discrete logarithms (IDL) constitute (among many other applications) the heart of respectively the confirmation and disavowal protocols for many undeniable signature schemes, and have therefore been the subject of many works. They vary depending on the exact kind of zeroknowledge property one wants to achieve. The basic honest-verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) proof of EDL is due to Chaum and Pedersen [CP92] , while the simplest HVZK proof of IDL is due to Camenish and Shoup [CS03a] . These protocols are usually described for ambient groups G with publicly known prime order, in which case recognizing G is trivial, so that these protocols are actually proofs that a tuple (X, Y, Z) ∈ G 3 is in DH G or not. They can be adapted to the case where the order of the ambient group is composite and secret using well-known techniques [Gir90, Gir91] , with the caveat that if G is not efficiently recognizable, the verifier must be promised that X, Y, Z ∈ G since these proofs do not in general ensure membership of X, Y, Z in G with negligible soundness. 3 Stated differently, if G is a cyclic and efficiently recognizable subgroup of G (e.g. G = Z * N and G = J N when J N is cyclic), these protocols are actually proofs that a tuple (X, Y, Z) ∈ G is a DH tuple with respect to G or not, assuming that the verifier is guaranteed that G is indeed a generator of G (which may not be efficiently checkable). The HVZK protocols for EDL and IDL are described in Appendix A. They can be strengthen to achieve various notions of zero-knowledge (against cheating verifiers) using known techniques [GSV98, CDM00, Dam00, Gen04] that we do not discuss in this paper.
The HVZK proofs of EDL and IDL can be made non-interactive in the Random Oracle Model using the Fiat-Shamir transformation [FS86] , i.e. by having the prover compute the challenge (first message from the verifier) by itself by applying a hash function to the commitment (first message from the prover). Note that these proofs then become universally convincing. 
Hashing into Groups
For many applications (and in particular for undeniable signatures based on the Chaum and van Antwerpen scheme [CvA89] ), it is required to securely hash into the subgroup G specified by the group generator Gen. Assuming the existence of good hash functions H from {0, 1} * into the ambient group G (which in turn can quite often be securely constructed from hash functions H k : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k ), there might or might not exist good constructions based on H for this. Whether a construction is good or not can be analyzed in the indifferentiability framework of Maurer et al. [MRH04, BCI + 10], modeling H k as a random oracle. In general, when G is an efficiently recognizable and sufficiently dense subset of G, defining H (x) = H(x i) for the smallest i ≥ 0 (encoded on sufficiently many bits) such that H(x i) ∈ G can be shown to be indifferentiable from a random oracle from {0, 1} * into G . More efficient constructions may exist depending on the specific case (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3). However, when the subgroup G is not (known to be) efficiently recognizable, there is in general no secure way to hash into it. In particular, the construction H (x) = G H k (x) will almost surely ruin the security of any scheme based on the discrete logarithm and related problems since this construction reveals the discrete logarithm in base G of its outputs. 4 In the sequel, we discuss, when they exist, good constructions of hash functions into each TDDH group we consider.
Trapdoor DDH Groups
We start by defining trapdoor DDH groups. Our definition is a refinement of the one of Dent and Galbraith [DG06] in that we explicitly require that the CDH problem remain hard even given the trapdoor τ enabling to solve the DDH problem.
Definition Definition 1. A trapdoor DDH group T DDH is a pair of algorithms (Gen, Solve) with the following properties. The trapdoor DDH group generator algorithm Gen is a PPT algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1 k and outputs a tuple ([G], G, τ ) where [G] is the description of a group G, G ∈ G is a group element of order 2 Θ(k) , and τ is a trapdoor information, such that: i) hardness of DDH without the trapdoor: the DDH problem is hard for the group generator Gen which outputs only ([G], G)
; ii) hardness of CDH with the trapdoor: the CDH problem is hard for Gen.
Solve is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm which takes as input ([G], G, τ ) and a tuple (X, Y, Z) ∈ G 3 , either accepts (outputs 1) or rejects (outputs 0), and satisfies the following: iii) completeness: for all ([G], G, τ ) possibly output by Gen, Solve always accepts on input a DH tuple
(X, Y, Z) ∈ DH G ; iv) soundness: for any PPT adversary A, the following probability is negligible:
We say that T DDH has perfect soundness when Solve always rejects on input a non-DH tuple (X, Y, Z), so that the above probability is zero.
Note that the soundness condition implies in particular that Solve, on input a uniformly random tuple (X, Y, Z) ∈ G 3 , accepts only with negligible probability. We silently assumed in the above definition that Solve is always run with a correctly generated trapdoor. This is safe for all examples presented below since there is an efficient way, given ([G], G, τ ), to check whether the trapdoor is correct. We assume that Solve outputs a special symbol ⊥ when this is not the case. We recall the original proposal of a TDDH group based on hidden pairings by Dent and Galbraith [DG06] in Appendix B.
A TDDH Group Based on Composite Residuosity
In this section, we describe a TDDH group T DDH BCP based on the group of quadratic residues modulo N 2 , where N is an RSA modulus. This group was first considered by Bresson, Catalano, and Pointcheval [BCP03] , who noticed that when the factorization of N is publicly available, this constitutes a gap group, i.e. a group where the CDH problem is hard and the DDH problem is easy. Here, we show that it constitutes in fact a TDDH group when the factorization of N is kept secret and used as the trapdoor. We first recall some basic facts about the group of quadratic residues modulo N 2 , where N is an RSA modulus. Let p, q be two safe primes where p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1 (p and q primes), and N = pq. The group QR N 2 of quadratic residues modulo N 2 is a cyclic group of order m = N p q . We define the notion of partial discrete logarithm.
Definition 2 (Partial Discrete Logarithm). Given a generator
Computing the partial discrete logarithm is believed to be hard without the factorization of N . 5 However, it can be efficiently computed given the prime factors of N (or simply λ(N )) as follows [Pai99] :
We now formally describe the TDDH group T DDH BCP . On input the security parameter 1 k , Gen BCP selects two k-bit safe primes p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1, sets N = pq, selects a random generator G of QR N 2 , and outputs
The Solve BCP algorithm works as follows: on input a tuple (X, Y, Z) ∈ (Z * N 2 ) 3 (as well as the trapdoor τ = (p, q)), it checks whether X, Y, Z ∈ QR N 2 , computes x = PDlog G (X), y = PDlog G (Y ), and z = PDlog G (Z) as described above, and checks whether z = x y mod N . It accepts if this holds and rejects otherwise. The security of this TDDH group relies on a "partial" version of the CDH problem, defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Partial CDH Problem).
We say that the Partial CDH problem is hard if for any PPT algorithm A, the following probability is negligible:
Theorem 1. Assuming that the DDH problem (without the factorization of N ), the CDH problem (with the factorization of N ), and the Partial CDH problem (without the factorization of N ) are hard for
Proof. We prove that properties i) to iv) of Definition 1 are satisfied. Properties i) and ii) follow directly from the assumptions that respectively the DDH (without the factorization of N ) and the CDH (with the factorization of N ) problems are hard in QR N 2 . Property iii) is straightforward to verify by definition of Solve BCP . Finally, property iv) follows from the hardness of the Partial CDH problem.
Note that this TDDH group does not have perfect soundness. In particular, on input a random tuple (X, Y, Z) ∈ (QR N 2 ) 3 , there is a negligible probability that Solve BCP accepts and yet (X, Y, Z) / ∈ DH G (this probability can easily be seen to be O(1/N ) [BCP03] ). Moreover, given the trapdoor τ = (p, q), and two random elements (X, Y ) ∈ (QR N 2 ) 2 , it is easy to generate Z such that (X, Y, Z) / ∈ DH G and yet Solve BCP accepts on input (X, Y, Z): simply compute x = PDlog G (X) and y = PDlog G (Y ) and output G x y mod N . Alternatively, given two random elements (X, Y ) ∈ (QR N 2 ) 2 and Z = CDH G (X, Y ), it is easy to compute Z = Z such that Solve BCP accepts on input (X, Y, Z ): simply compute Z = ZU N for some random U ∈ QR N 2 . This may be of concern in some applications, especially for undeniable signature schemes where Solve is typically used to check the validity of signatures (see Section 5). 6
Hashing into QR N 2 . The Quadratic Residuosity assumption states that no efficient algorithm can recognize elements of QR N 2 . Hence, it seems hard to securely hash into QR N 2 . In particular, using a hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z N 2 and squaring its output is inadequate in many settings since this reveals a square root of the output of the resulting hash function H = H 2 mod N 2 . However, it might be possible to use the group of signed quadratic residues QR + N 2 = J N 2 /{−1, 1} as in Section 4.3 in order to obtain an efficiently recognizable group with similar trapdoor DDH properties as QR N 2 . Since the lack of perfect soundness of this TDDH group restricts the range of its applications, we do not pursue this possibility further.
Static Trapdoor DDH Groups
In this section, we define and construct static trapdoor DDH groups. They are similar to trapdoor DDH groups as defined in Section 3, except that the trapdoor only allows to solve the DDH problem with respect to a specific pair of group elements (G, G x ). ii) hardness of CDH with the static trapdoor: for any PPT algorithm A, the following probability is negligible:
Definition
. 6 We note however that imperfect soundness is not a problem for the identification scheme outlined in [DG06] . 7 We stress that in typical applications, x is retained by an authorized user and is never made available to the adversary.
Solve is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm which takes as input 
We say that ST DDH has perfect soundness when Solve always rejects on input a non-DH tuple (X, Y, Z), so that the above probability is zero.
Again, we silently assumed that Solve is always run with the correct trapdoor τ x because in all examples below this can be checked efficiently. In the remainder of this section, we propose two constructions of static TDDH groups based respectively on the RSA problem and the factoring problem.
A Construction Based on the RSA Problem
We first show how a static TDDH group can be obtained from the RSA problem. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus. When (p − 1)/2 and (q − 1)/2 are coprime, then the subgroup J N of Z * N is cyclic. Moreover, when p and q are distinct safe primes, the DDH problem is widely believed to be hard in J N [Bon98] . We define the static TDDH group ST DDH RSA as follows. On input 1 k , the group generator Gen RSA selects two k-bit safe primes p = 2p +1 and q = 2q +1, defines N = pq and m = (p−1)(q −1)/2 = 2p q , selects a generator G of J N , and outputs Definition 5. We say that the RSA problem is hard for J N if for any PPT adversary A, the following probability is negligible: Proof. We show that properties i) to iv) of Definition 4 hold. Property i) holds by assumption that DDH is hard for J N . We now prove property ii). Assume that there is an adversary A breaking property ii).
We construct a reduction R that solves the RSA problem as follows. The reduction is given the product N = pq of two safe primes, a random e coprime with m = (p − 1)(q − 1)/2, and a random challenge Y ∈ J N of which it must compute the e-th root. The reduction draws a random X ← $ J N . With overwhelming probability, X is a generator of J N since p and q are safe primes. The reduction defines G = X e , and runs A on input ([J N ], G; X, Y ; e). The statistical distance between inputs (G, X, Y ) in the simulated experiment and in the real CDH experiment defining property ii) is negligible (the difference coming from cases where X does not generate J N ). Moreover, e is the correct trapdoor for X since G = X e implies e = 1/x mod m, where x = Dlog G (X). Hence, A returns the correct value Z = CDH G (X, Y ) with probability negligibly close to its advantage, in which case Z = Y x , which implies Z e = Y , so that Z is indeed the e-th root of Y . The running time of R is similar to the one of A and its success probability is negligibly close to the one of A. Property iii) is clear, and ST DDH RSA has perfect soundness since by definition of Samp RSA , x is coprime to m so that
Hashing into J N . Hashing into J N can be done easily as follows. Let H be a hash function into Z N (which can be easily constructed from a hash function into {0, 1} k ). Let a ∈ Z * N be a fixed integer such that a N = −1. Neglecting the cases where
When H is modeled as a random oracle, this construction can easily be shown indifferentiable from a random oracle into J N .
A Construction Based on Signed Quadratic Residues
In this section, we describe a static TDDH group based on signed quadratic residues, whose usefulness for cryptography was first noticed by Hofheinz and Kiltz [HK09] . This can be seen as a variant of ST DDH RSA described above, whose security relies on the factoring problem rather than the RSA problem. We first give some definitions. Let N = pq be a Blum integer (i.e. p and q are two primes such that p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4). Then −1 ∈ J N so that we can define J + N , which in this particular case is named the group of signed quadratic residues and denoted QR + N . 8 Its order is φ(N )/4 = (p − 1)(q − 1)/4. The most interesting points to notice about this group is that it is efficiently recognizable (since it is isomorphic to J N ∩ [1; (N − 1)/2]), and that the squaring operation is one-to-one so that any x ∈ QR + N has a unique square root in QR + N (more precisely, for any x ∈ QR + N , either x or −x mod N is a quadratic residue mod N , and exactly one corresponding square root is in QR + N ). Moreover, when (p − 1)/2 and (q − 1)/2 are coprime, then J N is cyclic and so is QR + N . See [HK09] for proofs of these basic facts. In the following, we restrict ourselves for simplicity to the special case where N is the product of two distinct safe primes. This implies that N is a Blum integer, and that (p − 1)/2 and (q − 1)/2 are coprime so that QR To build a trapdoor enabling to solve the static DDH problem for (G, X), we use the following idea: the trapdoor will be t = 2x ± m (computed over Z), i.e. the value 2x masked with the group order m. Since computing the group order m is as hard as factoring N , t does not reveal x. Now, given a group element Y = G y ∈ G, t enables computing Y t = G 2xy = CDH G (X, Y ) 2 . This enables testing whether an element Z is a correct solution to the static CDH problem (in other words to solve the static DDH problem) by simply checking whether Z 2 = Y t . However, as we will see, the static CDH problem remains as hard as computing square roots in QR + N , which in turn is equivalent to factoring N . For what follows, we will also make the assumption that the DDH problem is hard in QR + N . The DDH problem in QR + N can easily shown to be equivalent to the DDH problem in J N , which as already pointed out is widely believed to be hard when N is the product of two distinct safe primes [Bon98] .
We now formally define the static TDDH group ST DDH SQR . For ease of exposition, given an odd integer m, we define the function ξ from [0; m − 1] to {1, 3, 5, . . . , 2m − 3, 2m − 1} as: 8 We warn that QR + N is not equal to QR N /{−1, 1} for the good reason that −1 / ∈ QR N when N is a Blum integer.
ξ(x) is the unique odd integer t ∈ [1; 2m − 1] such that t = 2x ± m. On input the security parameter 1 k , Gen SQR selects two k-bit safe primes p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1, sets N = pq, m = p q , selects a generator G of the group of signed quadratic residues QR + N , and outputs Proof. We show that properties i) to iv) of Definition 4 hold. Property i) holds by assumption that DDH is hard in QR + N . We now show that property ii) holds under the factoring assumption (for the product of two safe primes). For this, we assume that there exists an adversary A solving the static CDH problem given the static trapdoor, and derive a reduction R that solves the factoring problem. The reduction is given a challenge N = pq which is the product of two safe primes. Denote By the previous analysis, we have that A returns the correct value Z = CDH G (X, Y ) with probability negligibly close to its advantage. In such a case, we have: . Hence, gcd(u − V, N ) yields a factor of N . The running time of R is similar to the one of A and its success probability is negligibly close to the one of A. Finally, property iii) is clear, and ST DDH SQR has perfect soundness (i.e. Solve SQR accepts iff it is run on input (X, Y, Z) ∈ DH G ) since the squaring operation is one-to-one, so that given 
Hashing into QR
Modeling H as a random oracle, then H can be shown indifferentiable from a random oracle into QR + N . Choosing two safe primes such that p ≡ 3 mod 8 and q ≡ 7 mod 8, then one can always choose a = 2.
Relation to the Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem
We note that in a static TDDH group with perfect soundness, the Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) problem [ABR01] is always hard. 9 The SDH problem is to compute CDH G (X, Y ) given X, Y ∈ G , and being granted access to a static DDH oracle which on input (Y , Z ) ∈ G 2 outputs 1 iff (X, Y , Z ) ∈ DH G . Clearly, an adversary A breaking the SDH problem can be turned into an adversary B breaking property ii) of the static TDDH group (B can answer queries of A to the static DDH oracle thanks to the trapdoor τ x it is given as input). Applying this observation to ST DDH SQR , we recover Theorem 3.2 of [HK09] which states that SDH is hard in QR + N under the factoring assumption. Hence, the concept of static TDDH group allows to cast the result of [HK09] in a more general framework. In particular, Theorem 2 directly implies that under the RSA assumption, the SDH problem is hard in J N , which complements the result of [HK09] . 10 As an immediate consequence of the results of [ABR01, CS03b] , we obtain that Hybrid ElGamal encryption over J N is IND-CCA2-secure in the ROM under the RSA assumption.
Convertible Undeniable Signatures
Background on Undeniable Signatures
In this section, we show how TDDH groups can be used to build simple and natural undeniable signature schemes with attractive properties such as universal convertibility and delegation. Undeniable signatures, introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen [CvA89] , are signatures that cannot be universally verified: confirmation (or disavowal) of a signature requires the cooperation of the signer (however a signer cannot deny the validity of a correct signature, hence the name undeniable). Later, Boyar et al. [BCDP90] proposed the refined notion of convertible undeniable signature (CUS) scheme, where a mechanism allows the signer to selectively or globally transform undeniable signatures into self-authenticating signatures. The particular scheme proposed in [BCDP90] was later broken in [MPH96] . Subsequently, schemes based on usual signatures such as ElGamal [DP96] , Schnorr [MS97] , and RSA [GRK00, GMP02, GM03] were proposed.
We first recall the basic Chaum and van Antwerpen undeniable signature scheme [CvA89] (in its Full Domain Hash version [OP01, OKH05] ). Let G be a group, G be a cyclic and efficiently recognizable subgroup of G, G be a (certified) generator of G , and H : {0, 1} * → G be a hash function (modeled as a random oracle in security proofs). Assume the DDH problem is hard for G . The secret and public keys of a user are x ∈ Z |G | + and X = G x respectively. To sign a message µ ∈ {0, 1} * , the signer computes M = H(µ) ∈ G , and S = M x . The signature is S. A signature S on µ is valid iff (X, H(µ), S) is a valid DH tuple (with respect to G). Since we assumed that the DDH problem is hard, checking the validity of a signature cannot be done without knowledge of x. 11 Hence, the signer must cooperate with the verifier in order to confirm or disavow a purported signature. The confirmation protocol is a proof that (X, H(µ), S) ∈ DH G (i.e. a proof of EDL since G is guaranteed to be a generator of G ), whereas the disavowal protocol is a proof that (X, H(µ), S) / ∈ DH G (i.e. a proof of IDL). The security of this scheme (depending on which type of EDL and IDL proofs are used) has been studied in [OP01, KH05, OKH05, KF08] .
The idea to allow efficient universal conversion of signatures is simply to use a Chaum and van Antwerpen undeniable signature with a (static or not) TDDH group, and to use the trapdoor to delegate the ability to verify undeniable signatures and to universally convert them. In the following, we describe the construction using static TDDH groups since the instantiations using constructions of Sections 4.2 and 4.3 are particularly interesting.
Construction of a CUS scheme from a Static TDDH Group
Let ST DDH = (Gen, Samp, Solve) be a static TDDH group with perfect soundness. For this part, we assume that Gen outputs a tuple ([G], G, τ ) such that G is cyclic and efficiently recognizable, and G is a generator of G. This assumption is satisfied by ST DDH RSA and ST DDH SQR . Note that there is not necessarily an efficient way to check that G is indeed a generator; we come back on this issue later. We construct a CUS scheme CU S as follows (see Appendix C for a more formal description). To construct his public/secret key pair, the signer runs Gen (1 k ) to obtain ([G], G, τ ) and then Samp([G], G, τ ) to  obtain (X, x, τ x ) . It also selects a hash function H : {0, 1} * → G. The public key of the signer is pk = ([G], G, X, H) and its secret key is sk = (x, τ x ). To sign a message µ ∈ {0, 1} * , the signer computes M = H(µ), and S = M x . The signature is S. The signer can confirm or disavow a signature by running a proof of EDL or IDL respectively with the verifier. To individually convert a signature, the signer produces a NIZK proof of EDL (using an independent hash function H FS to apply the Fiat-Shamir transform). To universally convert signatures, the signer releases τ x as universal receipt. A signature S for message µ can then be verified by running Solve([G], G; X, H(µ), S; τ x ) .
Informally, the two main security properties of a CUS scheme (beside soundness of the confirmation and disavowal protocols) are (see Appendix C.2 for details):
-security against existential forgery under chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA-security): any PPT attacker, given the receipt for universal verification τ x , and with access to a signing oracle, can forge a new signature with only negligible probability (note that access to confirmation or disavowal oracles is unnecessary here since the adversary is given the universal receipt τ x for checking signatures); -invisibility under chosen-message attacks (INV-CMA-security): any PPT adversary can distinguish a valid signature for a message of its choice from a string sampled uniformly at random from the signature space with only negligible probability. The adversary is granted access to the signing oracle, the confirmation and disavowal protocols, and the individual signature conversion oracle (with the restriction that they cannot be queried on the challenge message).
We stress that formalizing the invisibility notion is quite subtle (many variations appear in the literature [CvHP91, DP96, CM00, GM03]), and that the exact property that is achieved is dependent on the nature of the confirmation and disavowal protocols [OKH05, KF08] .
Theorem 4. When instantiated with a static TDDH group with perfect soundness, and when the confirmation and disavowal protocols are zero-knowledge, the CUS scheme described above is EF-CMA-secure and INV-CMA-secure in the ROM (for H and H FS ).
Proof. We first show EF-CMA-security. Assume there is an adversary A breaking EF-CMA-security of the scheme. We build a reduction R that breaks property ii) of the static TDDH group ST DDH. Let q h be an upper bound on the number of queries to H made by A. The reduction is given as input
It runs A on input pk = ([G], G, X, H) and ρ u = τ x . It simulates the random oracle H as usual in security proofs for Full Domain Hash, namely it guesses which oracle query will be used by A to forge a signature, and uses Y as answer to this query. Other answers to random oracle queries are computed as G α for known values α, which enable the reduction to simulate the signing oracle by computing the signatures as X α . When the guess for the forgery was right, the reduction obtains a signature S which is exactly Y x = CDH G (X, Y ). The success probability of the reduction is therefore Adv ef−cma CU S,A (k)/q h . Details are standard and therefore omitted. The proof for invisibility is exactly the same as the proof of Theorem 7 of [OKH05] (the sole difference is that here we have to simulate the individual conversion oracle but as usual this can be done without knowing Dlog G (X) using the zero-knowledge simulator).
Delegation. The ability to verify (confirm or disavow) and convert (either individually or universally) signatures can easily be delegated to a semi-trusted party by simply giving him the trapdoor τ x . Since the CDH problem remains hard even with the trapdoor, the third party cannot forge signatures on behalf of the signer. It can however prove in zero-knowledge whether a signature is valid or invalid (since it knows the witness τ x for this). We avoid using the term designated confirmer signatures [Cha94] here since this usually refers to schemes (mostly following the "encryption of a signature" paradigm [Oka94, CM00] ) where the signer can create designated confirmer undeniable signatures without having beforehand to transmit some secret information to the confirmer (in our case the trapdoor τ x ).
Instantiation with ST DDH RSA and ST DDH SQR . The CUS scheme described above can be instantiated with the two static TDDH groups described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. The schemes obtained this way are similar respectively to the scheme of Gennaro, Rabin, and Krawczyk [GRK00] and Galbraith and Mao [GM03] , with important distinctions though. Both schemes work over Z * N , but without explicitly restricting in which subgroup. As a consequence, they cannot be exactly seen as an instantiation of the Chaum and van Antwerpen scheme, and specific confirmation and disavowal protocols were therefore proposed for them (see also [GMP02] ). On the contrary, our schemes are strict instantiations of the Chaum and van Antwerpen scheme, and in particular the confirmation and disavowal protocols can use zero-knowledge proofs of EDL and IDL derived from the HVZK protocols described in Appendix A. This is conceptually simpler and more efficient (especially for the disavowal protocol).
Certifying signers public keys. Correct key generation is of primary importance in factoring-based undeniable signatures, since a cheating signer may generate its secret/public key in a different way than the one expected by verifiers, which may enable him to confirm invalid signatures or disavow valid ones (see [GMP02] ). Hence, the signer, when registering his public key, must prove to the certification authority (CA) that it was generated according to the specification of the static TDDH group generator. We now discuss this issue with respect to ST DDH RSA and ST DDH SQR . For both schemes, the signer must first prove to the CA that its modulus N is the product of two safe primes. A zero-knowledge protocol for this was proposed by Camenish and Michels [CM99] . Though expensive, this protocol must be run only once at key registration time. Then, the signer must prove that G is indeed a generator of either J N or QR + N . The situation is slightly different in the two cases. Denote N = pq with p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1. When p and q are safe primes, then an integer g ∈ Z * N such that g 2 = 1 mod N and gcd(g 2 − 1, N ) = 1 necessarily has order in {p q , 2p q } [GRK00, Lemma 1]. Hence, an ad-hoc solution for ensuring that the element G provided by the signer is a generator of the intended group is as follows. Restrict the scheme to moduli N such that N ≡ 1 mod 8 and fix g 0 = 2 so that g 0 ∈ J N . Since an element g ∈ QR + N generates QR + N exactly when g has multiplicative order modulo N in {p q , 2p q }, we see by the previous remark that g 0 is always a generator of QR + N . Hence, when using ST DDH SQR , we can impose to the signer to always use G = g 0 . Things are a bit more complicated when using ST DDH RSA , since for an element g ∈ Z * N with order in {p q , 2p q } to generate J N , one has to check that it is a quadratic non-residue. What we propose for this is that the signer proves in zero-knowledge to the CA whether g 0 ∈ QR N or not [GMR89] . If it is in QR N , then the signer tries with g 0 + 1, g 0 + 2, etc. until a quadratic non-residue in J N is found. The signer then has to use G = g 0 + i for the smallest i ≥ 0 such that g 0 + i ∈ J N \ QR N .
As a matter of fact, there seems to be no reason to instantiate the CUS scheme with ST DDH RSA rather than ST DDH SQR since both schemes are almost identical, except that the key registration step is simpler for ST DDH SQR .
A HVZK Proof of EDL and IDL in Groups of Unknown Order
In all the following, we let G denote the ambient group, G be a cyclic and efficiently recognizable subgroup of G, and G be a certified generator of G . We denote k G = log |G | + , and we interpret strings in {0, 1} as integers in [0; 2 − 1]. 
A.1 Proof of EDL
B A TDDH Group Based on (Hidden) Pairings
This construction was proposed by Dent and Galbraith in their original paper [DG06] . Let N = p 1 p 2 be the product of two primes such that p 1 ≡ p 2 ≡ 3 mod 4, and such that there are two large primes r 1 and r 2 such that r 1 |(p 1 + 1) and r 2 |(p 2 + 1). Let E : y 2 = x 3 + x be an elliptic curve over the ring Z N . Then |E(Z N )| = (p 1 + 1)(p 2 + 1). Let P = (x P , y P ) ∈ E(Z N ) be a point of order r 1 r 2 . Then the group generator outputs ([E(Z N )], P, τ ) where the trapdoor is τ = (p 1 , p 2 , r 1 , r 2 ). By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, a tuple (X, Y, Z) ∈ E(Z N ) 3 is a DDH tuple iff the elements reduce modulo p 1 and p 2 to valid DDH tuples in E(F p 1 ) and E(F p 2 ) respectively. Hence, to solve the DDH problem given τ , algorithm Solve solves the DDH problem in each group E(F p i ) using the Weil or Tate pairing [MOV93, FMR99] . The resulting TDDH group has perfect soundness, and we conjecture that this TDDH group satisfies Definition 1 (namely that CDH remains hard given the trapdoor). To the best of our knowledge, there is no known secure way to hash into P .
C Convertible Undeniable Signatures
C.1 Syntactic Definition
A Convertible Undeniable Signature (CUS for short) scheme CU S is specified by the following set of algorithms and protocols:
-KeyGen(1 k ): A randomized algorithm which, on input the security parameter 1 k , outputs a public/secret key pair (pk, sk) for the signer. -USign(pk, sk, µ): A potentially randomized algorithm which takes as input a public/secret key pair (pk, sk) and a message µ ∈ {0, 1} * , and returns an undeniable signature σ. Given a public/secret key pair (pk, sk) and a message µ, we say that a signature σ is a valid signature for m under (pk, sk) if σ is in the support of USign(pk, sk, µ), and invalid otherwise. When USign is deterministic, this boils down to USign(pk, sk, µ) = σ. We implicitly assume that there is an efficient algorithm which on input (pk, sk, µ, σ) decides whether σ is a valid signature for m under (pk, sk) (this is always the case when USign is deterministic). -Π con = (P con , V con ): The confirmation protocol which is run between the signer (with private input sk) and a verifier, on common input (pk, µ, σ). At the end of the protocol, the verifier outputs either valid (meaning that it considers the signature as valid) or ⊥ (meaning that it considers the validity of the signature as undetermined). -Π dis = (P dis , V dis ): The disavowal protocol which is run between the signer (with private input sk) and a verifier, on common input (pk, µ, σ). At the end of the protocol, the verifier outputs either invalid (meaning that it considers the signature as invalid) or ⊥ (meaning that it considers the validity of the signature as undetermined). -IConvert(pk, sk, µ, σ): A potentially randomized algorithm which on input pk, sk, a message µ and a signature σ, either outputs ⊥ if the signature is invalid, or an individual receipt ρ i (enabling to universally verify the signature) if σ is valid. -IVer(pk, µ, σ, ρ i ): A deterministic algorithm which on input pk, a message/signature pair (µ, σ), and a individual receipt ρ i , either accepts (outputs 1) or rejects (outputs 0). -UConvert(pk, sk): A potentially randomized algorithm which on input a public/secret key pair (pk, sk), outputs a universal receipt ρ u enabling to universally verify signatures created under (pk, sk). -UVer(pk, ρ u , µ, σ): A deterministic algorithm which on input pk, a universal receipt ρ u and a message/signature pair (µ, σ), either accepts (outputs 1) or rejects (outputs 0).
Given a public/secret key pair (pk, sk), we define the oracle Check (pk,sk) as follows: it takes as input a message µ and a signature σ. If σ is a valid signature for µ under pk, then it implements P con with private input sk and common input (pk, µ, σ), and otherwise it implements P dis (with the same inputs).
The scheme should satisfy the following correctness properties. For all (pk, sk) possibly output by KeyGen, all messages µ ∈ {0, 1} * , all valid signatures σ possibly output by USign(pk, sk, µ), and all invalid signatures σ for µ, the following holds with probability 1: -completeness of Π con : valid ← P con (sk), V con (pk, µ, σ) -completeness of Π dis : invalid ← P dis (sk), V dis (pk, µ, σ ) -1 ← IVer(pk, µ, σ, IConvert(pk, sk, µ, σ)) -1 ← UVer(pk, UConvert(pk, sk), µ, σ)
C.2 Security Definitions
The security goals for a CUS scheme are as follows. We assume that a public key unambiguously defines a finite signature space SigSp(pk).
-Π dis : run a zero-knowledge variant of the protocol for proving IDL of Appendix A to prove that (X, H(µ), S) / ∈ DH G -IConvert(pk, sk, µ, σ): Given a public key pk = ([G], G, X, H), a secret key sk = (x, τ x ), a message µ and a signature σ = S, check whether H(µ) x = S, and output ⊥ if this does not hold. Otherwise compute and output a NIZK proof ρ i that (X, H(µ), S) ∈ DH G (using a hash function H FS for the Fiat-Shamir transform) -IVer(pk, µ, σ, ρ i ): check that ρ i is a valid NIZK proof that (X, H(µ), S) ∈ DH G -UConvert(pk, sk): to universally convert undeniable signatures, the signer outputs the trapdoor τ x as the universal receipt ρ u . -UVer(pk, ρ u , µ, σ): To verify a signature σ = S on a message µ ∈ {0, 1} * with the public key pk = ([G], G, X, H) and the universal receipt ρ u = τ x , compute M = H(µ) and run algorithm Solve([G], G; X, M, S; τ x ), and accept the signature as valid iff Solve accepts.
